In [N. Alon, M. Feldman, A. D. Procaccia, and M. Tennenholtz, A note on competitive diffusion through social networks, Inform. Process. Lett. 110 (2010) 221-225], the authors introduced a game-theoretic model of diffusion process through a network. They showed a relation between the diameter of a given network and existence of pure Nash equilibria in the game. Theorem 1 of their paper says that a pure Nash equilibrium exists if the diameter is at most two. However, we have an example which does not admit a pure Nash equilibrium even if the diameter is two. Hence we correct the statement of Theorem 1 of their paper.
Introduction
In their interesting paper [1] on a competitive facility location game, Alon et al. addressed a diffusion game on an undirected graph G = 〈V, E〉 with a set of players N = {1, 2, . . . , n}. Each player i has an individual color c i , which is neither white nor gray. In this game, initially, all vertices are colored by white. At time one, each player i selects one vertex on a given graph, and colors the vertex by c i . If a vertex is selected by more than two players, it is colored by gray. At time t + 1, each white vertex is colored in c i (i ∈ N ), if it is adjacent to vertices colored by c i , but is not adjacent to vertices colored by c j for any j ∈ N \ {i}. A white vertex that has two neighbors colored by two distinct colors c i and c j (i, j ∈ N, i ̸ = j) is colored by gray. When there is no vertex whose color is changed from white in this time, the process terminates. A strategy profile x(∈ V N ) stands for a vertex selected by each player at time one. The utility of player i, denoted by U i (x), is given by the number of vertices colored by c i at the end of the process.
Given a strategy profile x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) and x ′ ∈ V , we denote by (x ′ , x −i ) a vector equals to x but with the ith component replaced by
A strategy profile x is a pure Nash equilibrium of this game, if
The paper [1] discussed a relationship between existence of pure Nash equilibria of this game and the diameter of the given graph. The diameter of a graph is the maximum distance between a pair of vertices. They showed that if the diameter is at most two then a pure Nash equilibrium exists, whereas if the diameter is greater than two then an equilibrium is not guaranteed to exist. In this paper, we show an example which does not admit a pure Nash equilibrium even though the diameter is two. Figure 1: A graph that does not admit a pure Nash equilibrium for two players. Table 1 : Utility bimatrix for the diffusion game induced by the graph in Figure 1 and two players. Element (i, j) implies (U 1 (v i , v j ), U 2 (v i , v j ) ). 0, 0) (4, 3) (3, 4) (5, 2) (5, 2) (4, 2) (5, 2) (4, 3) (5, 1) v 2 (0, 0) (4, 3) (4, 3) (5, 1) (5, 2) (5, 2) (4, 2) (5, 2) v 3 (0, 0) (4, 2) (5, 2) (4, 3) (5, 1) (5, 2) (5, 2) v 4 (0, 0) (4, 2) (3, 3) (4, 3) (3, 3) (4, 3) v 5 (0, 0) (3, 4) (3, 3) (3, 4) (3, 3) v 6 (0, 0) (4, 2) (3, 3) (4, 3)
Hence, we can see this game does not admit a pure Nash equilibrium. A point to notice in this example is that the diffusion process may repeat until time three. Let N v be the neighborhood of vertex v including v. 
where
does not hold for i = 1. Indeed, the right-hand-side of (1) becomes This condition implies that a vertex colored at time three is colored by only gray.
Theorem 2. When the restricted equivalent distance condition holds, the diffusion game with two players admits a pure Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, an equilibrium can be found in polynomial time.
Note that the restricted equivalent distance condition is a necessary and sufficient condition for Eq. (1) when there are two players. It is a future work to show necessary conditions for Eq. (1) for any number of players.
